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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

KARSENTY V. SCHOUKROUN: AN INTER VIVOS TRANSFER
OF PROPERTY, WHERE THE DECEDENT RETAINED
CONTROL DURING HIS LIFETIME, IS NOT PER SE
VIOLATIVE OF A SURVIVING SPOUSE'S STATUTORY
RIGHT TO A SHARE OF THE ESTATE.
By: Erin Day
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an inter vivos transfer
may not be invalidated, for the purpose of determining a spouse's
elective share, based solely on the fact that the decedent retained
control of the property during his lifetime. Karsenty v. Schoukroun,
406 Md. 469, 959 A.2d 1147 (2008). Even where such transfers
derogate a surviving spouse's statutory right to the decedent's net
estate, the transfer is not per se fraud. !d. at 490, 959 A.2d 1159.
Gilles H. Schoukroun ("Gilles") died in October 2004. His estate
planning arrangements were carried out in accordance with his will
and a revocable trust. Gilles' will bequested his tangible personal
property to his wife of four years, Kathleen Sexton ("Kathleen"). She
was also the beneficiary of Gilles' life insurance proceeds totaling
$200,000. Gilles had a contractual obligation to maintain a life
insurance policy naming his daughter from a previous marriage,
Lauren, as the beneficiary but, Gilles failed to do so. Instead, Gilles
named Lauren, as the beneficiary of the trust. He appointed himself as
the trustee and Maryse Karsenty ("Maryse"), his sister, as the trustee
upon his death, with Kathleen as the alternative trustee in the event
that Maryse could not serve. The trust, valued at about $422,000,
included three financial accounts and two IRA transfer-on-death
accounts.
In February 2005 Kathleen renounced Gilles' will and filed for a
statutory share of the estate. Kathleen filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County, claiming that the trust constituted
fraud in violation of her statutory right as the surviving spouse. The
circuit court determined that the trust did not constitute fraud. Both
parties appealed. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed
the trial court's disposition as to Kathleen's fraud claim. The Court of
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Appeals of Maryland granted Maryse's petition and Kathleen's
conditional cross-petition for writs of certiorari.
The court first analyzed Maryland's elective share statute which
provides surviving spouses with the option of either taking the
property left to them pursuant to the decedent's will, or taking a onethird share of the decedent's "net estate." Karsenty, 406 Md. at 487,
959 A.2d at 1157 (citing MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-203
(West 2008)). Looking at the "unambiguous" language of Section 3203 of the Estates and Trusts Article of the Maryland Code ("Section
3-203"), the court determined that "net estate" includes only property
to which the decedent retained an interest following his death.
Karsenty, 406 Md. at 488, 959 A.2d at 1158 (citing 1 PAGE OF THE
LAW OF WILLS§ 16.10(2003)). The court concluded that the trust
did not fall within the definition of "net estate" because Gilles' interest
in the trust terminated at his death. Karsenty, 406 Md. at 488, 959
A.2d at 1158. Therefore, in accordance with Section 3-203, Kathleen
was not entitled to a statutory share of the trust. /d. at 489, 959 A.2d
at 1158.
Kathleen maintained that the value of the trust should be included
as part of Gilles' net estate because the transfer to Lauren was invalid.
/d. at 489, 959 A.2d at 1158-59. Kathleen argued that a per se rule
had been established in Maryland, requiring that inter vivos transfers
be pulled into the decedent's net estate when the decedent retained
control of the property. /d. at 491, 959 A.2d at 1159 (citing Knell v.
Price, 318 Md. 501, 569 A.2d 636 (1990)). The court decided that a
decedent's control over property during life did not, in and of itself,
constitute per se fraud. Karsenty, 406 Md. at 491, 959 A.2d at 115960. The decision to set aside such agreements should be done on a
case-by-case basis, after considering all surrounding facts and
circumstances. /d. at 491, 959 A.2d at 1160.
The court next analyzed the facts and circumstances to be
considered in determining the validity of such transfers. /d. at 502,
959 A.2d at 1166. Historically, inter vivos transfers were invalidated
when the court determined that the transfer was a "mere device or
contrivance." /d. at 507, 959 A.2d at 1169 (citing Hays v. Henry, 1
Md. Chan. 337 (1851)). While that precise language has been
abandoned, the standard remains the same. Karsenty, 406 Md. at 509,
959 A.2d at 1170. In a case involving a revocable deed of trust, the
court refused to invalidate the trust as violative of spousal rights based
on the determination that the transfer was "complete and bona fide."
/d. at 509, 959 A.2d at 1170 (citing Brown v. Fid. Trust Co., 126 Md.
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175, 94 A. 523 (1915)). Here, although Gilles retained control over
the trust during his life, a decedent's retained control alone does not
discern a genuine inter vivos transfer from a fraud. Karsenty, 406 Md.
at 501, 959 A.2d at 1165-66.
Admitting the difficulty in distinguishing a bona fide transfer from
a "sham," the court listed three considerations to assist in the analysis.
/d. at 514, 959 A.2d at 1173. First, is whether the decedent retained an
interest in, or continued to enjoy, the transferred property. /d.
Although such control does not, by itself, invalidate the transfer, it
raises the question of good faith. Id. at 515, 959 A.2d at 1173 (citing
Mushaw v. Mushaw, 188 Md. 511, 519, 39 A.2d 465, 468 (1944)).
Second, judicial discretion should not be used to undo estate planning
arrangements which are valid and legitimate. Karsenty, 406 Md. at
515, 959 A.2d at 1174. Third, the validity and legitimacy of such
arrangements should be assessed after considering a number of
relevant factors. /d. at 516, 959 A.2d at 1174.
The court analyzed several factors, but noted that the list
expounded is not exhaustive. /d. at 525, 959 A.2d at 1180. First, is
the extent of control retained by the decedent. /d. at 516, 959 A.2d at
1174. The court noted that in every case involving an invalidated inter
vivos transfer, the decedent retained a "significant" amount of control.
/d. The court should also consider whether the decedent actually
exercised that retained control. /d. at 522, 959 A.2d at 1178.
Excessive control or enjoyment of the property suggests that the
decedent did not truly intend to part with ownership. /d. Here, the
circuit court indicated that while Gilles retained control over the trust,
he did not exercise that control or interfere with the trust. /d. at 523,
959 A.2d at 1179.
Furthermore, the motives of the decedent and the beneficiary of the
inter vivos transfer should be considered. /d. at 517-19, 959 A.2d at
1175-76. The decedent's motives may indicate that the transfer
"actually was intended to be complete and bona fide." /d. at 518, 959
A.2d at 1175. Also, in addition to possible collusion, future courts
should consider whether the beneficiary's motives were to defraud the
decedent or the surviving spouse. /d. at 519, 959 A.2d at 1176.
Another factor is the degree to which the surviving spouse is
deprived of property that otherwise would have been included in the
decedent's net estate. /d. at 20, 959 A.2d at 1176. The inter vivos
transfer is more likely to be valid when the decedent leaves reasonable
provisions for the surviving spouse. /d. at 520, 959 A.2d at 1177.
Here, the circuit court determined that Gilles did not intend to defraud
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Kathleen, rather, he intended to provide for both Lauren and Kathleen.
ld. at 519, 959 A.2d at 1176. The court noted that although Lauren
benefited more, Kathleen was by no means left destitute. Jd. at 522,
959 A.2d at 1178.
A final factor is the familial relationship between the decedent and
the beneficiary of the inter vivos transfer. Id. at 524, 959 A.2d at
1179. A transfer is more likely valid if made to support children from
a previous marriage, especially when the surviving spouse and
decedent were only recently married. ld. Not only did Gilles have a
pre-existing obligation to provide for Lauren, but Gilles and Kathleen
were only married a short time. Id. at 525, 959 A.2d at 1179.
Karsenty established the current standard for determining the
validity of an inter vivos transfer that affects the statutory entitlements
of a surviving spouse. An inter vivos transfer will not be set aside
based solely on the decedents retained control of the transferred
property, and careful planning can ensure the validity of such
transfers. For example, the decedent should not exercise excessive
control over the property during his lifetime. Additionally, the transfer
will seem more bona fide where there is a legitimate purpose behind
the transfer, as well as reasonable, alternative provisions for the
surviving spouse. Maryland estate planners should be aware of this
decision and the specific facts and circumstances that tend to illustrate
a legitimate and bona fide inter vivos transfer of property.

